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1
Peter Allen, Gunman Who Shot Dead a Paris Policewoman the Day after the Charlie Hebdo
Attack IS Linked to the Killers Who Gunned Down Magazine Staff, Say Police, DAILYMAIL.COM (Jan. 9,
2015), www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2903347/Gunman-shot-dead-Paris-policewoman-day-CharlieHebdo-attack-linked-killers-gunned-magazine-staff-say-police.html.
2 Mohamed Madi et al., As It Happened: Charlie Hebdo Attack, BBC, www.bbc.com/news/live/
world-europe-30710777 (last visited July 27, 2015).
3
Harriet Alexander, Paris Attacks: Special Forces Hit Amedy Coulibaly with 40 Bullets, THE
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2015, 9:49 PM), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11338 925/
Paris-attacks-Special-forces-hit-Amedy-Coulibaly-with-40-bullets.html.
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At 11:30 a.m. on January 7, 2015, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi,
masked, dressed in black, and armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles,
approached the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French magazine. They
forced one of the magazine’s cartoonists to enter the code to the newsroom
door. Upon entering the room, the men opened fire and killed the editor,
Stephane Charbonnier, and four Charlie Hebdo cartoonists along with
several others. The gunmen shouted, “We have avenged the Prophet
Muhammad” and “God is Great” in Arabic as they called out the names of
the journalists. The gunmen escaped by car.
During the chase, Amedy Coulibaly, a friend of the two terrorists,
killed a policewoman in Montrouge,1 and on January 9, took several people
hostage at a kosher supermarket at Porte de Vincennes. He threatened to kill
the hostages unless the Kouachi brothers were allowed to go free.2 At
around 5:00 p.m. that day, the police stormed the supermarket and killed
Coulibaly, while another operation launched at the same time killed the
Kouachi brothers, who were hiding in a printing firm in Dammartin-enGoele.3
Both individuals and the French government responded zealously to
the attack on Charlie Hebdo. Social media became saturated with the
hashtag #JeSuisCharlie, or #IAmCharlie, as French citizens and individuals
abroad rushed to show solidarity with the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo and
the cause of freedom of speech. The French government commenced
“aggressive enforcements” of Law No. 2014-1353 of November 13, 2014,
an anti-terrorism law that was rarely used until the weeks prior to the
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4
Doreen Carvajal & Alan Cowell, French Rein In Speech Backing Acts of Terror, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/world/europe/french-rein-in-speech-backing-acts-ofterror.html?_r=0.
5
Eleanor Beardsley, The French Debate: Free Speech Versus Hate Speech, NPR (Feb. 10,
2015), www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/02/10/384959376/the-french-debate-free-speech-versus-hate
-speech.
6
Alexander Stille, Why French Law Treats Dieudonné and Charlie Hebdo Differently, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 15, 2015), www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/french-law-treats-dieudonne-charliehebdo-differently.
7
Jonathan Turley, The Biggest Threat to French Free Speech Isn’t Terrorism. It’s the
Government, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-it-means-tostand-with-charlie-hebdo/2015/01/08/ab416214-96e8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html.
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attacks, against anyone who spoke out against the Charlie Hebdo cause.4
Among those prosecuted for their speech was Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala, a
French comedian, who was arrested for “defending terrorism” in a
Facebook status that read, “Tonight, as far as I’m concerned, I feel like
Charlie Coulibaly.” The statement is a combination of the slogan “Je suis
Charlie” (“I am Charlie”) and “Amedy Coulibaly,” the name of the gunman
who terrorized the kosher supermarket, and appears to imply sympathy with
the terrorists. He was fined $37,000.5
Various commentators and scholars have pointed out the double
standard in the French government’s treatment of speech, especially in the
wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. The New Yorker noted that “[t]he
juxtaposition of . . . the celebration of a magazine that routinely publishes
cartoons considered blasphemous and offensive by many of the world’s
Muslims and the muscular prosecution of a relentlessly provocative black
comedian” made the hypocrisy glaringly obvious.6 Similarly, Jonathan
Turley reflected in the Washington Post about the spontaneous rally in
support of Charlie Hebdo after the attacks: “[O]ne could fairly ask what
they were rallying around. The greatest threat to liberty in France has come
not from the terrorists who committed such horrific acts this past week but
from the French themselves, who have been leading the Western world in a
crackdown on free speech.”7
Indeed, the French government has a history of using its speech laws
to curtail the speech of journalists, comedians, celebrities, and ordinary
citizens alike. That same tendency of restricting speech came into play in
the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, when the French government
simultaneously punished critics for their speech and glorified Charlie
Hebdo as a symbol of freedom of speech.
At the core of the French double standard is its inconsistent distinction
between protection and punishment of provocative speech. In Part I, this
paper will look briefly at how international law treats provocation, in
particular, Articles 19–20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights (ICCPR). Then, Part II will look at the ways French speech
law embodies the aforementioned double standard because of its failure to
adopt the international standard on provocation. The paper will conclude by
advocating for a more uniform, more protective approach to speech—one
that will bring French law into conformity with international law.
PART I
International Law on Provocative Speech
The ICCPR is an international human rights treaty adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1976.8 Two Articles pertain directly to the freedom of
speech. Article 19 delineates “the right to hold opinions without
interference” and “the right to freedom of expression.”9 Article 19(3) states
that these rights are “subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights
or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” Article 20(2) of
the ICCPR specifies further limits for free speech, prohibiting “any
propaganda” and “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”10
In reference to the restrictions on speech in Article 19(3), General
Comment No. 34 prepared by the U.N. Human Rights Committee
highlights that:

This Comment is significant as it notes the need for a “specific” threat
that is “direct[ly] and immediate[ly]” tied to the expression. In other words,
expression cannot be limited on the basis of a potential threat. Instead, the
limitation is akin to the “incitement to imminent violence” standard in U.S.
jurisprudence. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court found that
the government could not prohibit speech “except where such advocacy is
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8
FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU, www.aclu.org/faq-covenantcivil-political-rights-iccpr (last updated Apr. 2014).
9
U.N. GAOR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 16,
1966), www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.
10
Id.
11
U.N. HRC Gen. Comment No. 34, 102nd session, July 11–29, 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept.
12, 2011).
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When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of
freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and
individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the
necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular
by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the
expression and the threat.11
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directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.”12
ICCPR Article 20’s limits on speech should be interpreted in a similar
vein. General Comment No. 34 notes that:
Articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other.
The acts that are addressed in article 20 are all subject to restriction
pursuant to article 19, paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is
justified on the basis of article 20 must also comply with article 19,
paragraph 3.13

12
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395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
Gen. comment No. 34, supra note 11, ¶ 50, at 12–13.
14
Barbora Bukovska et al., Towards an Interpretation of Article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds
for the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred, art. 19 at 21, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/
ICCPR/Vienna/CRP7Callamard.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 17.
17
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
18
Asma Uddin, Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions: A Case for the U.S. Standard 131
(2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Brigham Young University Law Review) (quoting
Professor Robert C. Post).
13
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A 2010 study prepared for the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) echoes this position.14 According to the study,
Article 20, in practice, requires courts to evaluate speech based on a series
of tests. If the speech in question meets the standard of “the most severe and
deeply felt form of opprobrium,” has “specific intent,” contains a “direct
and/or explicit call to commit the action–discrimination, hostility or
violence,” is directed at a general public or individuals in a public space,
leads to imminent harm, and is “very likely to result in criminal action and
harm,”15 then the speech can be restricted. However, if the speech in
question does not pass even one of these tests, it could not be legitimately
prohibited.16
The listed criteria are similar to the distinction drawn by the
Brandenburg Court, which held that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence”
constitutes protected speech, whereas “preparing a group for violent action
and steering it to such action” is not.17 The first category of speech falls
within the ambit of provocation, whereas the latter constitutes incitement to
imminent violence.
A speaker provokes violence by engaging in speech that causes a
listener to be “so outraged that [he feels] compelled to riot and commit
mayhem.”18 In contrast, a speaker incites violence when he or she intends to
produce imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action.
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Measured against the OHCHR’s criteria, provocation, unlike incitement, is
protected speech because it does not involve “specific intent,” a “direct and/
or explicit call” to violence or crime, or the possibility of leading to
“imminent harm.” As such, a state cannot, in accordance with international
law, limit speech amounting to mere provocation.
The U.N.’s independent human rights experts support this
interpretation of international law. In a 2008 statement joined by other
independent experts, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression, Frank La Rue, proclaimed that, “Restrictions on freedom of
expression . . . should never be used to protect particular institutions, or
abstract notions, concepts or beliefs, including religious ones.”19 In 2006,
then-U.N. Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion, Asma Jahangir,
stated:
the right to freedom of religion or belief as enshrined in relevant
international legal standards, does not include the right not to have a
religion or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule . . . defamation
of religions may offend people and hurt their religious feelings but it
does not necessarily or at least directly result in a violation of their
rights, including the right to freedom of religion.20

19
20

Evelyn Aswad, To Ban or Not to Ban Blasphemous Videos, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1313, 1326

Id. at 1327.
Asma Uddin & Haris Tarin, Rethinking the “Red Line”: The Intersection of Free Speech,
Religious Freedom, and Social Change, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Nov. 2013, at 1–2, www.brookings.
edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/11/us%20islamic%20world%20forum%20publications/Free%
20Speech_English_Web.pdf.
21
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(2013).
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The U.N.’s independent human rights experts have advocated for a
line drawing that does not restrict speech that merely criticizes religious
beliefs, or is offensive to people of particular faiths. Instead, the human
rights experts view offensive and critical speech as provocation, a category
of speech protected under the ICCPR.
The experts have maintained this clarity despite a protracted battle
over the precise standard. In 1999, Pakistan proposed a resolution at the
U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) that sought to condemn “defamation of religion”; the
goal of the so–called Defamation of Religions Resolution was to “protect
religion generally and Islam specifically from ‘hate speech’”21 by urging
states to “take all appropriate measures to combat hatred, discrimination,
intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by
religious intolerance, including attacks on religious places, and to
encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to
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freedom of religion or belief.”22 The Resolution had many flaws, as it
“accorded human rights to religion/ideology rather than to individuals,” and
“sought to limit the speaker rather than the violent actor.”23
Over the years, there was a decline in support for the Resolution.
Finally, in March of 2011, the OIC and the U.N. Human Rights Council
made significant progress in recognizing the fundamental right of human
expression. The OIC worked closely with the United States to reach
consensus on a new resolution that entirely foregoes the “defamation of
religions” language. Rather than protecting religions, the resolution protects
religious persons. U.N. Human Rights Council resolution 16/18, titled
“Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence, and Violence against Persons
Based on Religion or Belief,” condemns “any advocacy of religious hatred
against individuals that constitutes incitement or discrimination, hostility or
violence.” Instead of sanctioning broad limits on speech in order to prevent
the “defamation of religion,” Resolution 16/18 interpreted ICCPR Article
20(2) to proscribe only “incitement to imminent violence based on religion
or belief,”24 and suggested concrete steps “to foster a domestic environment
of religious tolerance, peace and respect.”25
Resolution 16/18 thus brought the international consensus back to the
incitement standard for freedom of expression, a standard that does not
restrict provocative speech.
PART II
The French Double Standard

A Brief Overview of French Free Speech Law
“[C]riminalization of anti-religious speech forms part” of France’s
“human rights tradition,” with speech restricted in the name of public
order.26 Article 10 of France’s DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
22

Defamation of Religions, H.R.C. Res. 1999/82 (Apr. 30, 1999).
Uddin & Tarin, supra note 21, at 2.
24
Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20 (2), Dec. 19, 1966, U.N.T.S. 171.
25
Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 62
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 347, 361 (2011).
26
Susannah C. Vance, The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offenses Under
European Convention Principles, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 221 (2004).
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Part I outlined the current international standard on provocative
speech. Part II will examine French speech laws and the ways in which
France’s failure to comply with the international standard leads to
contradictory speech restrictions.
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states that “[n]o one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions,
including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb
the public order established by law.”27 The Declaration inspired the LAW OF
JULY 29, 1881,28 the “backdrop”29 upon which more recent anti-racism laws
have been framed, prohibited any public speech that provoked a crime or an
attempted crime.30 Nearly sixty years later, the décret Marchandeau, an
amendment to the LAW OF JULY 29, 1881, enabled individuals to bring
charges if they “had been named personally in a racist invective.” It also
allowed state prosecutors to “initiate legal proceedings in cases where a
whole group was implicated.”31 In practice, however, the state rarely
prosecuted under the décret Marchandeau, and courts were reluctant to
apply the law outside the context of public disorder.32
In the years to follow, French civil rights organizations began to push
for stricter laws against racist speech.33 The push was partly based on
increasing concerns about racism resulting from an influx of foreign
workers, and partly on France’s signing and ratifying of the U.N.
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.34
These proposed laws, eventually combined into the PLEVEN LAW OF 1972
(which amended the LAW OF JULY 29, 1881), banned “hate speech, making
racial defamation and provocation to racial hatred or violence punishable by
criminal law.”35 More specifically, it proscribed “speech in both public and
non-public places . . . that ‘provoke discrimination, hatred or violence
against a person or a group of people’ on account of ethnicity, nationality,
race, or religion.”36 In recent decades, the PLEVEN LAW has been used in

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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27
Declaration Des Driots de L’Homme et Du Citoyen [Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen], Aug. 26, 1789 (Fr.), translated in The Avalon Project (Yale Law School, Lilian Goldman
Library).
28
Prior to 1881, French free speech law was complex and unclear. The Law of July 29, 1881
served to replace this jurisprudence. RAYMOND KUHN, THE MEDIA IN FRANCE, 47–49 (1994).
29
Vance, supra note 26, at 222.
30
Loi de 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberte de la presse [Law of July 29 1881 on Freedom of the
Press] LEGIFRANCE.GOUV.FR, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000607
07 22&dateTexte=vig.
31
Karen Bird, Racist Speech or Free Speech? A Comparison of the Law in France and the
United States, 32.4 COMP. POL. 399, 408 (2000).
32
For example, in the 1971 case, Perroux v. Ministere Public, journalist Christian Perroux was
acquitted of racially denigrating speech for his article criticizing Jewish French citizens for maintaining
allegiance with Israel. The tribunal found that, although Perroux’s statements were “insulting and
injurious . . . of a nature to damage the honor and reputation of the targeted persons,” the law “was not
intended to protect individuals, but to punish agitation against the general public peace.” Id. at 417.
33
Id. at 408.
34
Id.
35
Erik Bleich, Race Policy in France, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (May 1, 2001), www.
brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/05/france-bleich.
36
Roni Cohen, Regulating Hate Speech: Nothing Customary About It, 15.1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 229
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high-profile cases, with academics, politicians, and movie stars charged
under it for inciting racial hatred.37
Despite the PLEVEN LAW broad prohibitions, racist speech and hate
crimes continued to increase. These crimes, such as a horrific desecration of
a Jewish cemetery attributed to a virulently anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic
group,38 led to the adoption, in July of 1990, of the highly controversial
GAYSSOT LAW, which reinforced previous anti-racism laws and made the
denial of the Jewish Holocaust a criminal offence.39 In 2001, France enacted
the TAUBIRA LAW,40 which defines the African slave trade as a “crime
against humanity.” In 2003, it passed the LELLOUCHE LAW, “a stand-alone
hate crimes law that enhances penalties for violent crimes motivated by
racism.”41 Most recently, on November 13, 2014, the French parliament
passed LAW NO.2014-1353, which further amended the Law of July 29,
1881.
A Way Forward: Clarifying “Public Order”
A key concern of all of the aforementioned provisions is maintaining
public order. “Hate speech legislation has been justified as a pragmatic
response to increasing interethnic tensions, ensuring that diverse groups can
cohabit peacefully.”42 Yet, despite the centrality of the concept, the law
nowhere defines “public order” (or, ordre public).43 French “courts have
never articulated a clear definition of public order. Rather, judges seem to
take into consideration the public mood at a particular time and place to
determine whether a certain expression is likely to cause a dangerous public
disruption.”44 Ordre public has become “a function of time and place.”45
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(2014); Loi de 29 juillet 1881 sur La Liberte de la Presse [Law of July 29 1881 on Freedom of the
Press], LEGIFRANCE.GOUV.FR, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000607
07 22&dateTexte=vig.
37
Vance, supra note 26, at 224.
38
Id.
39
Richard Brody, Injure Raciale, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2011), www.newyorker.com/culture/
richard-brody/injure-raciale.
40 Agnes Poirier, How the Maverick Christiane Taubira Is Transforming French Politics, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:09 EDT), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/14/christianetaubira-french-politics.
41
Erik Bleich, Hate Crime Policy in Western Europe: Responding to Racist Violence in Britain,
Germany, and France, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 149, 158 (2007).
42 Vance, supra note 26, at 230.
43
Loi 2014-1353 de 13 novembre 2014 renforcant les dispositions relatives a la lutte contre le
terrorisme (1) [Law 2014-1353 of November 2014 on Strengthening the Provision on the Fight Against
Terrorism], www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
44
Bird, supra note 31, at 407 (emphasis added); Charles W. Mondora, The Public Policy
Exception, “The Freedom of Speech, or of the Press” and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139 (2008). While the public order exception
functions in French law as the “public policy” exception works in American law, the latter is not used by
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American courts to restrict speech; on the contrary, it acts to ensure that other laws do not impede on
constitutional free speech guarantees. See id.
45
Gerhart Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REV. 37, 42 (1938).
46
Bird, supra note 31, at 407.
47
Mike Wendling, #FreeSpeechStories: France Accused of “Double Standards”, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 17, 2015), www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-30850879.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Carvajal & Cowell, supra note 4.
51
James McAuley, There’s a Model for How France Should Treat Its Muslims. It’s How France
Treats Its Jews, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 16, 2015), www.newrepublic.com/article/120796/reaction-charliehebdo-shooting-highlights-free-speech-disparity.
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And given this fluid definition, the ultimate arbiter of protected versus
unprotected speech is “the general will itself.”46
This fluidity naturally creates uncertainty and contradictions, most
recently reflected in the French government’s response in the wake of the
Charlie Hebdo attacks. On one hand, the government upheld Charlie
Hebdo as a bastion of free speech, and on the other hand, it brutally cracked
down on contrarians like Dieudonné. In the face of this contradictory
response, commentators have tried to muster clarity in French free speech
jurisprudence.
French media lawyer, Emmanuel Pierrat, drew the line at speech about
religion: “in France you can make drawings or speeches against ideology or
against religion. The Revolution of 1789 abolished the crime of
blasphemy”47 and “courts have consistently upheld the legality of speech
directed at religions or historical religious figures.”48 But France’s history
of singling out religion does not provide a principled basis for continuing to
do so, especially since France’s approach to speech protections generally
has changed so dramatically over time.49
Another media lawyer, Mathieu Davy, tried to explain the “double
standard” as: “I have the right to criticize an idea, a concept or a religion. I
have the right to criticize the powers in my country. But I don’t have the
right to attack people and incite hate.”50 And yet, how exactly the statement
“I feel like Charlie Coulibaly” “attacks” people or “incites hate,” instead of
criticizing an idea or concept, is unclear.
While these explanations try to draw clear, principled lines, they
ultimately fail—in part because they do not account for the role of an
unclear “public order” exception to speech protection, one that restricts or
protects provocative speech depending on whether it suits the political will.
French law “selectively protects the dignity of certain communities and
minority groups more than others.”51 In addition to the Dieudonné example,
consider that, while a cartoon depicting a Muslim being shot while holding
the Qur’an, drawn in reference to the massacre of 1,300 protestors against

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 102 Side B

04/28/2016 10:11:02

11 - UDDIN_4.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

198

4/25/16 9:33 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 11:189

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

52
Didier Fassin, In the Name of the Republic: Untimely Meditations on the Aftermath of the
Charlie Hebdo Attack, 31.2 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 3, 4 (2015).
53
Scott Sayare, France: Commentator Convicted for Inciting Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/europe/19briefs-France.html.
54
Richard Brody, Injure Raciale, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2011), www.newyorker.com/culture/
richard-brody/injure-raciale.
55
David Remnick, The Shadow of Anti-Semitism, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2015),
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Egyptian General Sisi’s coup, did not result in any arrests, a sixteen-yearold was arrested for posting on Facebook a spin-off of the same cartoon,
this time depicting the Charlie Hebdo director being shot down with a copy
of the magazine in his hands.52
And unlike its approach to anti-Muslim speech, the French
government cracks down on anti-Arab speech. In February 2011, French
commentator Eric Zemmour was convicted of “provocation to racial
discrimination” for declaring on television that “the majority of drug
dealers are blacks and Arabs” and that employers “have the right” to deny
them employment.53 And Brice Hortefeux, who once served as the Minister
of the Interior, has been convicted of “racial insult” for comments caught on
video regarding Arabic immigrants, and fined seven hundred and fifty
euros.54
Similarly, the French government prosecutes anti-Semitism
aggressively.55 John Galliano, the head designer at Christian Dior, was fired
and charged with “injure raciale” after a video of him making anti-Semitic
remarks surfaced. French-Cameroonian comedian Dieudonné M’Bala
M’Bala has been convicted seven times and fined various amounts for his
anti-Semitic comments.56 Even Charlie Hebdo engaged in self-censorship:
in 2008, the French satire magazine fired one of its most famous and oldest
cartoonists, Siné, for writing an article considered to be anti-Semitic.57 And
yet, when Siné wrote a piece in which he stated that he “could not bear
Muslims” and that “when he saw a veiled woman he wanted to ‘kick her in
the ass,’”58 there were no protests from the director of the magazine.
Unclear guidelines also accede too much power to the government. In
addition to France’s already-stringent laws on free speech, after the Charlie
Hebdo attacks, the Justice Ministry issued new rules to prosecutors and
judges for trying those who defended the attacks.59 Thousands of police and
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soldiers were deployed around the country, moving to quash any racist
remarks or praise for terrorists by “detaining anyone who shows even
verbal support for terrorism or racism and anti-Semitism.”60 More than fifty
people were arrested for defending terrorism over the two week period
following the attacks, several of which were convicted under special
immediate sentencing measures.61 Among those punished for inciting
terrorism was a mentally ill man who declared, “They killed Charlie, I had a
good laugh,” a man who posted “[u]sing a pencil and using a Kalashnikov
are the same” on Facebook; and the above-mentioned sixteen-year-old who
reproduced on Facebook a cartoon that supported the terrorists.62 The
French police even went as far as to detain and question an eight-year-old
boy who said, “The French must be killed. I am with the terrorists. The
Muslims did well, and the journalists got what they deserved.”63
One way to bring consistency to speech protections in France is to
delineate the precise contours of the “public order” exception in the way
international law suggests. ICCPR Article 19 requires a “specific” threat
that is “direct[ly] and immediate[ly]”—rather than merely potentially—tied
to the expression. The parallel incitement to imminent violence standard
protects “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence.”64 These principles are
widely applicable across various speech types, amenable to consistent
application, and protective of a much broader range of speech.
CONCLUSION
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The French government’s reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks
brought to the fore the vague, overbroad nature of French speech laws and
their inherent potential for abuse. Its blatant double standard in punishing
politically unfavorable speech highlights the need for clear guidance, and,
more specifically, the usefulness of drawing the line where international
law does: at incitement rather than provocation.

